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Natural language quantifiers (e.g., few, many, not much) 
and probability expressions (e.g., likely, possible, not prob-
able) are used to communicate information about quantities, 
frequencies, and probabilities. A great deal of psychologi-
cal research addressed the role of these expressions in com-
munication and thinking. Some of the problems addressed 
include how quantifiers and probability expressions are 
mentally represented, the range of quantitative values they 
can convey in different contexts, how speakers choose ap-
propriate expressions, how listeners interpret their meaning, 
and how they are used in reasoning and decision making 
(Geurts, 2003; Moxey & Sanford, 2000; Sanford & Moxey, 
2004; Teigen & Brun, 1999, 2003). Empirical evidence sug-
gests that these expressions are more than just vague ex-
pressions of quantities. In this paper we will focus on two 
functions of quantifiers: first, perspective effects due to 
quantifier focus, and second, the use of quantifiers as face-
managing devices. 
An important property of quantifiers which was studied 
in a series of studies by Sanford and Moxey (Moxey, 2006; 
Moxey & Sanford, 2000; Sanford, Dawydiak, & Moxey, 
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2007; Sanford & Moxey, 2003, 2004; Sanford, Moxey, & 
Paterson, 1996) is quantifier focus. Quantified sentences 
may bring to mind different sets that constitute logical rep-
resentations of quantified sentences. For example, the sen-
tence some of the football fans went to the game may refer to 
two sets: (a) the set of all fans who went to the game (refer-
ence set) and (b) the set of all fans who didn’t go to the game 
(complement set). In this example, the reference set is more 
prominent than the complement set. In other words, it is in 
focus, and it can be referred to by pronouns. The sentence 
they enjoyed the game is acceptable as a continuation of the 
previous sentence, but they watched it on TV instead is not. 
However, the sentence they watched it on TV instead is ac-
ceptable as a continuation of the sentence not all of the fans 
went to the game. Moxey and Sanford have analyzed the 
focusing patterns of many natural language quantifiers with 
different methods, including the continuation task, reading 
time measures, and eye-tracking procedures. They conclud-
ed that quantifiers differ in focusing: quantifiers like hardly 
any, few, not many, not all, and less than half induce com-
plement set focus, while quantifiers like a few, many, and 
more than half induce reference set focus. It is important 
to note that quantifiers which may refer to a similar range 
of quantities (few and a few; almost all and not quite all) 
can have different focusing properties. For example, they 
watched it on TV instead is a more appropriate continua-
tion of few of the fans went to the game than of a few of 
the fans went to the game. Bajšanski and Valerjev (2011) 
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demonstrated similar patterns of sentence continuations for 
Croatian quantifiers malo (few) and nekoliko (a few). 
The perspective effect comparable to the focusing pat-
terns of quantifiers was demonstrated for verbal probability 
expressions and it was labeled as the directionality of prob-
ability expressions (Budescu, Karelitz, & Wallsten, 2003; 
Teigen & Brun, 1999, 2003). Positive probabilistic phrases 
(for example probable, possible, likely) differ from negative 
phrases (improbable, doubtful, unlikely) in the focusing of 
attention to the occurrence or non-occurrence of a described 
event. 
The second function of quantifiers and their use as 
face-management devices was investigated by Bonnefon, 
Feeney, and Villejoubert (2009). Their research was mo-
tivated by politeness theory (Brown & Levinson, 1987). 
According to the politeness theory, each individual has a 
social face which is defined as a sense of positive identity 
or desired public image. People are motivated to maintain 
face during social interaction. Face includes two compo-
nents: positive face and negative face. Positive face is the 
need to be liked and to maintain a positive self-image, and 
negative face is the need for autonomy and for the freedom 
of thought or action. Any action or utterance that threatens 
positive or negative face is called a face-threatening act. 
Acts that can be interpreted as impositions or restrictions 
are threats to negative face, and acts that can be interpreted 
as criticisms or disapprovals are threats to positive face. 
Many actions or utterances are possible threats, so speakers 
often use linguistic politeness strategies that mitigate those 
threats. Making offers, joking, giving sympathy, avoiding 
disagreement, and seeking agreement are some of the forms 
of positive politeness, or expressing friendliness and admi-
ration. Apologizing and giving deference are examples of 
negative politeness, or avoiding impeding or imposing on 
others (Holtgraves, 2002).
One of the politeness strategies is hedging, or weak-
ening a statement a speaker knows to be true and which 
could present a threat to the face of the hearer. Bonnefon 
and Villejoubert (2005) argue that when verbal probability 
expressions like probably or possibly modify face-threaten-
ing sentences they perform a face-management function of 
communication. Such probability phrases are used in these 
contexts not for communicating a judgment of likelihood 
but as politeness markers. Examples of the use of verbal 
probability phrases for hedging are: it is possible that you 
are wrong and you will probably have to pay much more. 
Bonnefon and Villejoubert (2005) tested this assump-
tion by analyzing the properties of membership functions of 
the probability expressions possibly and probably in neutral 
and face-threatening contexts. This approach is based on the 
assumption that probabilistic phrases are vague concepts 
which can cover a range of numeric probabilities. Wallsten, 
Budescu, Rapoport, Zwick, and Forsyth (1986) analyzed 
the meaning of probability expressions using membership 
functions, and this method was used in many later studies 
(e.g., Budescu et al., 2003). The membership function of a 
probability phrase (e.g., likely, not probable) assigns a real 
number to each numeric probability value between 0 and 1. 
This number represents the degree of membership of nu-
meric probability in the concept defined by the phrase. The 
degree of membership is represented as a number between 
0 and 1. A membership of 0 denotes numeric probabilities 
that are not in the concept of a probability phrase, whereas 
a membership of 1 refers to probabilities which are perfect 
exemplars of this concept, and other values between 0 and 
1 denote intermediate membership. How are membership 
functions obtained? In a typical study, participants are asked 
to rate the combinations of numeric probabilities and verbal 
probability phrases. For example, they may be asked to rate 
how well the phrase likely describes the numeric probability 
0.1, and this procedure is then repeated for other phrases 
and for the range of numeric values (0, 0.1, 0.2 ... 1). The 
ratings obtained are then scaled between 0 and 1. 
Bonnefon and Villejoubert (2005) demonstrated that 
verbal probability phrases had different membership func-
tions in face-threatening contexts than in neutral contexts. 
Their participants judged that sentences like You will prob-
ably have to pay for the cinema tickets (face-threatening 
context) refer to higher probabilities than sentences like 
Next week Scotland will probably experience a major snow 
storm (neutral context), as it was revealed by membership 
functions. 
Bonnefon and Villejoubert (2006) showed that when a 
medical condition is qualified by a probability phrase, hear-
ers assign higher numerical probabilities to more severe 
conditions. Participants were asked to imagine being told 
by the doctor that it might be possible that they will suf-
fer from insomnia or deafness. Possible deafness was as-
sociated with higher probabilities than possible insomnia. 
Furthermore, 60% of the participants judged that the doctor 
was qualifying deafness as possible because she wished to 
be tactful, compared to 17% when the doctor was predict-
ing possible insomnia. Thus, greater severity increases the 
chance that the probability phrase will be interpreted as a 
politeness marker rather than as an expression of uncer-
tainty. 
Juanchich, Sirota, and Butler (2012) proposed that in 
addition to likelihood communication and hearer face-man-
agement, verbal probabilities can also serve the speaker’s 
interest by decreasing the chance of being blamed for an 
incorrect prediction. In five experiments they showed that 
different probability terms are often used as a speaker face-
management device. In order to avoid being criticized for 
the wrong prediction, the speaker may use a verbal prob-
ability phrase to communicate a lower degree of certainty.
In addition to the politeness functions of verbal prob-
abilities, Bonnefon et al. (2009) proposed that the quantifier 
some can also perform a face-management function. Sen-
tences of the form some A are B are typically understood to 
mean that not all A are B. This inference is an instance of 
25
GULAN, VALERJEV and BAJŠANSKI, Interpretation of quantifiers in face-threatening contexts, Review of Psychology, 2014, Vol. 21, No. 1, 23-29
scalar inference: when a speaker is not in the position to use 
a stronger item from an ordered scale (for example <some, 
all>), the speaker will then use a weaker item. Bonnefon et 
al. were interested in identifying the contexts in which peo-
ple are not likely to endorse such an inference. They argue 
that the inference from some X-ed to not all X-ed is made 
less available when X threatens the face of the listener, and 
illustrate this with the following example:
A: What impression did I make during dinner?
B: Some thought you drank too much.
They tested this hypothesis in three experiments, and 
their results supported the hypothesis that some X-ed could 
be interpreted as all X-ed in face-threatening contexts. For 
example, 83% of the participants judged that the sentence 
some people loved your poem implied that not all loved the 
poem, compared to 58% when the sentence was some peo-
ple hated your poem. Thus, in a face-threatening context 
people are less likely to endorse the inference from some 
to not all. Therefore, Bonnefon et al. (2009) demonstrated 
that speakers tend to construe the quantifier some as a hearer 
face-management device, in situations in which all implies 
a threat to the face of the listener. 
Our hypothesis is that the opposite could be expected 
for negative quantifiers. In particular, we expected that few 
in face-threatening contexts could actually mean zero. For 
example, few people liked your poem could be interpreted to 
mean no one liked your poem. For the positive quantifier a 
few, similar interpretations were expected as for some. 
This hypothesis is based on the Sanford and Moxey 
(2004) analysis of the problem of whether the meaning of 
quantifiers includes the null set. Some quantifiers, for ex-
ample less than five, should include the null set. However, 
whether the semantics of quantifiers, such as few or hardly 
any, include the null set is not clear. They proposed that the 
inclusion of the null set may be tested with sentences such 
as hardly anybody went to the meeting, if anybody did. To 
the degree to which this seems acceptable, it is possible that 
the null set is included in the meaning of the sentence. San-
ford and Moxey (2004) report on the unpublished data by 
Majid and Sanford, who investigated the acceptability of the 
sentence frame (QUANTIFIER) of the people went to the 
meeting, if any. Their results revealed a high acceptability 
for the quantifiers few, hardly any, not many, and less than 
30 per cent, and low acceptability for positive quantifiers 
such as all, many, and more than 80 per cent. Contrary to 
their expectations, a relatively high acceptance was revealed 
for the quantifiers some and a few. The empirical question is 
which contextual factors influence the null set interpretation 
of different quantifiers. Following the results of Bonnefon et 
al. (2009), we propose that face-threatening contexts could 
influence the interpretation of the quantifier few in a way 
that they make the null-set interpretation more prominent. 
The design of the following study was based on Bonne-
fon et al. (2009) second experiment in which they adopted 
the membership function approach for the analysis of the 
meaning of the quantifier some. Their scenarios described 
groups of six people. Participants read the critical sentences 
which referred to the described groups. These sentences 
were in the form some people X-ed in a face-boost context 
(some people loved your poem) and in a face-threatening 
context (some people hated your poem). The participants 
were asked to judge how likely it was that the speaker would 
use the word some if she knew that the number of people 
who loved/hated the poem was actually one, and this ques-
tion was repeated for all values up to six. This approach 
allowed them to compute membership functions for some 
in different contexts. For the value of 6, membership ratings 
were higher in face-threatening than in face-boost context. 
We adopted the same approach, but we wanted to analyze 
membership functions for the quantifiers few and a few as 
well, and we included the value of 0 (Zero people loved your 
poem). In particular, we expected membership ratings for 
the quantifier few to be higher in a face-threatening context 
compared to the face-boost context for the value of zero. For 




One hundred and seventy-one psychology students par-
ticipated in the study for course credit. All participants were 
Croatian native speakers and the experiment was conducted 
in Croatian.
Materials and design
Three scenarios adapted from Bonnefon et al. (2009) 
were used in the study: poem, trip, and speech. For exam-
ple, the poem scenario describes the situation in which a 
participant has to imagine joining a poetry club and that her 
poem is discussed by six other members of the club. After 
the discussion, one of the members states: some people liked 
your poem. Each scenario was combined with one of the 
six forms of critical sentences, obtained by combinations 
of three quantifiers and two conditions: positive and nega-
tive. Thus, critical sentences were in the following form: 
(QUANTIFIER) people liked/didn’t like your poem. Two 
other scenarios and the ensuing critical sentences were cre-
ated in a similar way. Half of the participants read three sto-
ries in a positive (liked) condition, and half in the negative 
condition (didn’t like). Each story contained a sentence with 
one of the three quantifiers: malo (few), nekoliko (a few), 
and neki (some). Quantifiers were counterbalanced across 
these different stories. Each participant read each story with 
one quantifier. There were six experimental conditions, re-
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sulting from the combination of the condition (positive vs. 
negative) and the quantifier. It should be noted that for the 
quantifier malo (few) positive conditions are face-threat-
ening, while for the quantifiers nekoliko (a few) and neki 
(some) negative conditions are face-threatening.
Procedure
The study was conducted in small groups of participants. 
Within each group, approximately half of the participants 
were assigned to the positive group and half to the negative 
group. The participants were instructed to read three sce-
narios and to answer questions for each scenario. Member-
ship judgments were collected after participants read each 
scenario. Participants rated on 11-point scale (anchored at 
totally unlikely and totally likely) how likely it would be 
that the speaker would utter a critical sentence if he knew 
exactly that the number of people who liked (or didn’t like 
in negative condition) the poem was zero. This question was 
then repeated for each number of people up to six. 
RESULTS 
Membership judgments were assigned numeric values 
between 0 and 10, and membership functions were com-
puted by averaging membership judgments across partici-
pants. Two groups of dependent measures were analyzed by 
the analysis of variance. The first group consisted of aver-
age membership ratings, and the second group consisted 
of peaks of membership functions. Average membership 
ratings were computed for each response option, i.e., for 
each size of the group between 0 and 6, as an average rat-
ing across all participants. Second, peaks of the member-
ship functions were calculated for each participant and each 
quantifier as an average response option (group size) that 
were given the highest ratings. 
First, we analyzed membership ratings for the group of 
six and zero separately for each quantifier. Figure 1 pre-
sents the function values for the quantifier neki (some) in 
the positive and negative condition. Critical analyses were 
carried out for the membership of 0 and 6 people. We ex-
pected that for the six people average membership ratings 
would be higher in the negative (“some people didn’t like 
your poem”) than in the positive condition (“some people 
liked your poem”), because the negative condition is face-
threatening. No difference was expected for zero people. A 
two way ANOVA was conducted with average membership 
ratings as a dependent variable with group size (zero and 
six) and condition (positive and negative) as independent 
variables. A significant main effect of group size was ob-
tained, F(1, 169) = 44.75, p < .01: ratings were higher for 
the group of six (M = 2.62, SE = 0.27) than for the group 
of zero (M = 0.66, SE =0.14). The main effect of context 
was not significant, F(1, 169) = 3.06, p > .05. However, the 
interaction between two factors was significant, F(1, 169) 
= 4.75, p < .05. Post-hoc analysis (Duncan test) revealed a 
significant difference for the membership of six: the ratings 
were higher in the face-threat condition (M = 3.21, SE =  
0.37) than in the face-boost condition (M = 2.04, SE = 0.38). 
Thus, we replicated the results of Bonnefon et al. (2009): 
participants judged that it was more likely that the speaker 
would utter some people didn’t like your poem when the 
speaker knew that all six people didn’t like the poem than 
Figure 1. Membership functions for the quantifier neki (some). Figure 2. Membership functions for the quantifier malo (few).
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if she would uttered some people liked your poem when she 
knew that all six people liked the poem. For the membership 
of 0, there was no significant difference between the face-
threat (M = 0.61, SE = 0.19) and the face-boost context (M 
= 0.71, SE = 0.20). 
Figure 2 presents the membership functions for the 
quantifier malo (few). We hypothesized that for zero people 
average membership ratings would be higher in the positive 
(few people liked your poem) than in the negative condi-
tion (few people didn’t like your poem), and no difference 
was expected for six people, because the positive condition 
represents a face-threatening context. A two-way ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of the group size, F(1, 
169) = 4.53, p < .05. Ratings were higher for the group of 
zero (M = 1.95, SE = 0.24) than for the group of six (M = 
1.23, SE = 0.20). Although the main effect of condition was 
not significant, F(1, 169) = 3.16, p > .05, the interaction 
effect was significant, F(1, 169) = 10.34, p < .01. Post-hoc 
analysis revealed a significant difference between the posi-
tive and negative condition: membership of zero was 2.75 
(SE = 0.34) in a face-threatening context and 1.15 (SE =  
0.34) in a face-boost context. Participants judged that it was 
more likely that the speaker would utter few people liked 
your poem when she knew that zero people liked the poem 
than if she would uttered few people didn’t like your poem 
when she knew that zero people didn’t like the poem. For 
the group of six there was no significant difference. 
Membership functions for the quantifier nekoliko (a few) 
are shown in Figure 3. Similar patterns of differences were 
expected as for quantifier some. A significant main effect of 
the group size was detected, F(1, 169) = 32.95, p < .01: rat-
ings were higher for the group of six (M = 2.33, SE = 0.26) 
than for the group of zero (M = 0.59, SE = 0.14). Neither 
the main effect of context, F(1, 169) = 0.19, p > .05, nor the 
interaction between context and group size was significant, 
F(1, 169) = 0.09, p > .05. Therefore, contrary to our expec-
tations, the quantifier nekoliko showed different member-
ship patterns than the quantifier neki.
Second, we analyzed differences in the peaks of mem-
bership functions for each quantifier. The peak of the mem-
bership function is the average of the response values that 
were given the highest membership ratings. It was calculat-
ed for each participant, for each of the three quantifiers, as 
an average among all numerical values (0-6) that received 
the highest ratings. Thus, values obtained were used as de-
pendent variables in three analyses of variance. 
A two-way ANOVA was carried out with quantifier and 
condition as independent variables. The main effect of the 
quantifier was significant, F(2, 338) = 261.37, p < .01. The 
peak of the membership function was lower for the quanti-
fier malo (M = 2.23, SE = 0.10) than both for neki (M = 4.48, 
SE = 0.10) and nekoliko (M = 4.39, SE = 0.10). Neither the 
main effect of condition, F(1, 169) = 3.68, p = .06, nor the 
interaction, F(2, 338) = 2.20, p > .05, was significant. 
DISCUSSION
In this study we investigated the interpretation of the 
quantifiers some, few, and a few in face-threatening con-
texts. We expected that the interpretation of few would dif-
fer from the interpretations of some and a few due to the 
property of focus. The results of this study supported the 
hypothesis of Bonnefon et al. (2009) about the use of the 
quantifier some as a face-management device. We replicated 
their results, and obtained similar membership functions for 
the statements in the form of some X-ed. Participants judged 
that it was more likely that the speaker would say some 
people didn’t like your poem when in fact each member of 
the group did not like it, than they would say some people 
liked your poem when all did. In a face-threatening context 
the quantifier some is not used to communicate information 
about the proportion of the people who liked the poem, or 
to implicate that some people did not like the poem, but to 
mitigate the threat to the face of the hearer. 
We proposed that similar considerations could be ap-
plied to other natural language quantifiers as well. If this 
were the case, other quantifiers would be used also for po-
liteness purposes. However, different interpretations were 
expected for quantifiers with different focusing properties. 
The results obtained for the quantifier few supported those 
claims: few people X-ed can be used to express that no one 
X-ed in a polite way when no one X-ed threatens the face of 
the hearer. It was expected that the quantifier a few would 
show similar membership functions as the quantifier some. 
However, our hypothesis was not confirmed. Membership 
Figure 3. Membership functions for the quantifier nekoliko (a 
few).
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functions for a few were almost identical in positive (face-
boost) and in negative contexts (face-threat). A probable ex-
planation is that a few cannot be used to denote zero or all, 
and is thus unsuitable for hedging statements of the form all 
people X-ed, or no one X-ed. 
The results obtained in this study contribute to the grow-
ing evidence that quantifiers and verbal probability phrases 
play an important role in everyday communication as ex-
pressions of politeness (Bonnefon et al., 2009; Bonnefon, 
Fenney, & De Neys, 2011; Bonnefon & Villejoubert, 2006). 
Face-threatening acts may be modified with those expres-
sions in order to soften their potential effects on the hearer. 
By using them the speaker reduces clarity and avoids di-
rectness, and as a result decreases the risk of offending the 
hearer. This lack of clarity and directness is a fundamental 
feature of language communication (Lee & Pinker, 2010). 
However, reducing clarity in favor of politeness in some 
situations may lead to misunderstandings with serious con-
sequences (Bonnefon et al., 2011). 
Further research should address the question of how oth-
er quantifiers are used in face-threatening contexts. Further-
more, the ways in which quantifiers and probability phrases 
modify other expressions that present a potential threat to 
both the positive and negative face of the hearer should also 
be the subject of further investigation. According to polite-
ness theory, the magnitude of face threat depends on several 
dimensions: (a) the culturally influenced degree of the im-
position of a particular act, (b) the social distance between 
the speaker and the hearer, and (c) the relative power of the 
hearer over the speaker (Holtgraves, 2002; Lee & Pinker, 
2010). It can be hypothesized that these dimensions influ-
ence the interpretation of quantifiers and verbal probability 
phrases in face-threatening contexts. Finally, Juanchich et 
al. (2012) suggested that besides hearer face-management, 
verbal probabilities are often used as a speaker face-man-
agement device. Using verbal probability phrases like prob-
able and possibly and thus communicating a lower degree of 
certainty decreases the risk of being criticized for a predic-
tion which may prove wrong. Quantifiers such as some and 
few might also perform speaker a face-management func-
tion. 
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